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A Preferable Approach for the Ninth
Circuit
Procter Hug, Jr. t
Carl Tobias:j:
United States Senators Orrin Hatch (R-Utah) and Frank Murkowski
(R-Alaska) recently introduced Senate Bill 2184, which would split the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit into two circuits. 1
This measure differs from Senate Bill 253 that embodies the recommendations submitted to Congress by the Commission on Structural Alternatives
for the Federal Courts of Appeals after its one-year study.2 The
Commission found "no persuasive evidence that the Ninth Circuit ... is
not working effectively" and clearly rejected bifurcation. 3 However, the
Commission recommended that Congress impose a divisional restructuring
on the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals and authorize the other appellate
courts to adopt divisional arrangements when their caseloads increase. 4
Because Congress is still considering both legislative proposals, they require careful assessment. This analysis reveals that the two bills do not
adequately treat the concerns that animated the study; the bills actually
contradict the Commission's goals 5 and suggest drastic solutions for
Copyright© 2000 California Law Review, Inc. California Law Review, Incorporated (CLR) is a
California nonprofit corporation. CLR and the authors are solely responsible for the content of their
publications.
t Chief Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
:j:
Professor of Law, William S. Boyd School of Law, University of Nevada, Las Vegas. I thank
Chris Bryant, Jay Bybee, Michael Higdon and Peggy Sanner for valuable suggestions, Jim Rogers for
generous, continuing support, and Angela Dufva for processing this piece. We thank Mark Mendenhall,
Assistant Circuit Executive, for invaluable assistance. These are our views, but they reflect those of
two-thirds of the Ninth Circuit's members
1. See S. 2184, 106th Cong. (2000); see also 146 CONG. REc. S 1233 (daily ed. Mar. 7, 2000).
Senator Hatch is the chair of the Judiciary Committee.
2. See generally COMMISSION ON STRUCTURAL ALTERNATIVES FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS OF
APPEALS, FINAL REPORT (1998) [hereinafter COMMISSION REPORT]; see also id. at 93-99 (providing the
"proposed statutes" on which senators premised S. 253).
3. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 29.
4. See id. at 29-30.
5. For these views of circuit-splitting as well as a description of the Commission's goals, see id.
at ix-x, 34-37, 44, 47-50. For critical views of the divisional structure, see Federal Courts-Proposed
Changes to the Ninth Circuit and the Federal Courts of Appeals, 113 HARv. L. REv. 822, 825 (2000)
[hereinafter Critique].
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problems that do not exist. Moreover, the Ninth Circuit has instituted an
approach that is preferable to either alternative. A Ninth Circuit Evaluation
Committee is assessing the court in light of the Commission's investigation
and is crafting responses to certain concerns. Since the endeavor will be
more effective than the radical, irrevocable strategies of bifurcation or divisional restructuring, the Committee's work also merits analysis. This
essay undertakes that effort.
We first summarize and critically evaluate the Commission's report
and recommendations. Our essay then describes and scrutinizes the reasons
proffered for splitting the circuit generally and for Senate Bill 2184 in particular. Finally, we consider a less dramatic and disruptive, and more
promising, means to address certain perceived concerns identified by the
Commission and the sponsors of Senate Bill 2184. We conclude that the
Evaluation Committee approach will better attain the objectives of the
Commission and of Senate Bill 2184 proponents; therefore, Congress
should reject both the divisional concept and circuit splitting.

THE WORK

A.

I
OF THE COMMISSION AND ITS RECOMMENDATIONS
The Commission's Authorization and Work

The history of the Commission has received relatively extensive
treatment elsewhere.6 Congress approved the Commission principally as a
response to ongoing controversy over the Ninth Circuit. 7 The court's size
has prompted perennial calls for reconfiguration.8 Since 1983, lawmakers
who championed a split have instituted numerous efforts to bifurcate the
circuit. 9 In 1997, Congress authorized an assessment. 10 The Commission
had a year to study the "structure and alignment of the Federal Court of
Appeals system, with particular reference to the Ninth Circuit," and to
write a report with recommendations for such structural or boundary
6. See, e.g., Procter Hug, Jr., The Commission on Structural Alternatives for the Federal Courts
ofAppeals' Final Report: An Analysis of the Commission's Recommendations for the Ninth Circuit, 32
U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 887 (1999); JenniferE. Spreng, Three Divisions in One Circuit?: A Critique of the
Recommendations From the Commission on Structural Alternatives for the Federal Courts of Appeals,
35 IDAHO L. REv. 553 (1999); Carl Tobias, Suggestions for Studying the Federal Appellate System, 49
FLA. L. REV. 189 (1997).
7. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 33-34. See generally Arthur D. Hellman, The
Unkindest Cut: The White Commission Proposal to Restructure the Ninth Circuit, 73 S. CAL. L. REv.
377 (2000); S. REP. No. 104-197 (1995).
8. See, e.g., S. 431, 105th Cong. (1997); S. 956, 104th Cong. (1995). See generally Critique,
supra note 5.
9. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 33-34. See generally Jennifer E. Spreng, The
Icebox Cometh: A Fonner Clerk's View of the Proposed Ninth Circuit Split, 73 WASH. L. REv. 875,
876 (1998).
10. See Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies
Appropriations Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-119, § 305, 111Stat.2440, 2491-93 (1997). See generally
Hellman, supra note 7, at 378-81; Hug, supra note 6, at 892-93; Spreng, supra note 6, at 560.
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changes "as may be appropriate for the expeditious and effective
disposition of the caseload of the Federal Courts of Appeals, consistent
with fundamental concepts of fairness and due process." 11
The Commission appeared to implement carefully its important responsibilities.12 In 1998, the Commission sought written input and held six
public hearings.13 It also assembled statistical data, such as the percentages
of oral arguments and published opinions that the court affords, the time
needed for resolving appeals, and the measures employed since the 1970s
to address caseload increases. 14 In October, the Commission issued a tentative draft report with recommendations and solicited public comment on
this tentative draft for thirty days. 15 After considering the public input, the
Commission issued a minimally-changed final report that suggested that
Congress require a divisional approach for the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals and empower the other courts to apply divisional concepts as they
grow.16
In January 1999, Senators Slade Gorton (R-Wash.) and Murkowski
introduced Senate Bill 253, proposed legislation that essentially embodies
the Commission's suggestions. 17

11. Pub. L. No. 105-119, § 305(a)(l)(B)(ii)-(iii), 111 Stat. at 2491. See generally Tobias, supra
note 6, at 206-11.
12. We rely in this paragraph on COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 1-6 and Carl Tobias, A
Federal Appellate System for the Twenty-First Century, 74 WASH. L. REv. 275, 295-98 (1999).
13. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 2-3; see also Joseph N. Akrotirianakis et al., JerryBuilding the Road to the Future: An Evaluation of the White Commission Report on Structural
Alternatives for the Federal Courts ofAppeals, 36 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 355, 362 (1999).
14. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 21-25, 39; see also REPORT OF THE FEDERAL
COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE 109 (1990) (stating that caseload increases have transformed the circuits).
15. See COMMISSION ON STRUCTURAL ALTERNATIVES FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS OF APPEALS,
TENTATIVE DRAFT REPORT (Oct. 1998). See generally Hug, supra note 6, at 893-94; Spreng, supra
note 9, at 877-78.
16. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at iii, 40-47, 59-76. See generally Hug, supra note 6,
at 897-98; Spreng, supra note 6, at 577-86; Tobias, supra note 12, at 304-10.
17. Compare S. 253, 106th Cong. (1999) with COM?lllSSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 93-99; see
also supra note 4 and accompanying text. In July of 1999, the Senate and House each held a committee
hearing on the proposed legislation and on the final report prepared by the Commission. See Review of
the Report by the Commission on Structural Alternatives for the Federal Courts of Appeals Regarding
the Ninth Circuit and S. 253, the Ninth Circuit Reorganization Act: Hearing Before the Senate
Judiciary Subcomm. on Admin. Oversight and the Courts (1999) [hereinafter Senate Hearing];
Oversight Hearing on the Final Report of the Commission on Structural Alternatives for the Federal
Courts of Appeals Before the House Judiciary Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual Property (1999)
[hereinafter House Hearing]. Between the dates of the Senate and House hearings, Senator Dianne
Feinstein (D-Cal.) introduced a bill that would essentially reform the en bane process. See S. 1403,
106th Cong. (1999); 145 CONG. REc. S8884 (daily ed. July 20, 1999); see also infra notes 93-94, 102
anti accompanying text.
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Analysis of the Commission Report and Recommendations

The Commission analyzed the circuit's pressures, emphasizing size, 18
and canvassed ideas favoring and opposing bifurcation. Advocates of a
split contended that circuit case law lacks sufficient consistency; that the
court cannot decide appeals in a timely fashion; that its judges are unable
to "keep up with the large volume" of opinions; and that there is
inadequate judicial collegiality and interpersonal communication. 19
Moreover, the limited en bane process is purportedly flawed because it
does not represent the unified voice of the circuit membership and contributes to a high Supreme Court reversal rate.20
Those arguing against bifurcation pointed out that over two-thirds of
Ninth Circuit judges oppose a split and believe the limited en bane process
works well.21 The court is among the fastest circuits in resolving cases once
argued or submitted to panels, and any delay in processing appeals from
the time of filing is attributable to excessive vacant judgeships. 22 Opponents also contended that the court has established a sophisticated issuetracking system that allows judges to stay informed of the current law, that
the judges are as collegial as those in any circuit, and that technology's
continued use will improve communication and case disposition. 23
Although the Commission possessed no empirical data to justify a
major change in Ninth Circuit structure, it proposed restructuring the court
of appeals into three semi-autonomous divisions. Each division would review its panel decisions en bane, and a Circuit Division would consider
only "square interdivisional conflicts."24 The Commission stated that its
plan to modify the structure of the Ninth Circuit would enhance predictability, communication, and ties to local communities, yet retain a large
circuit's administrative benefits.25
18. These include geographic scope, 28 active appellate judgeships and 8,700 annual appeals.
See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 30-32; Critique, supra note 5, at 823.
19. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 34-35, 38-40; see also Critique, supra note 5, at 823.
20. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 34-37; Critique, supra note 5, at 823; see also Act
of Oct. 20, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-486, § 6, 92 Stat. 1629, 1633 (1978) (authorizing the limited e11 bane
process); 9TH CIR. R. 35-3 (implementing the limited e11 bane process).
21. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 35-36, 38; Critique, supra note 5, at 824; Hug,
supra note 6, at 897-98, 906-08.
22. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 34. Judicial vacancies complicate efforts to
assemble sufficient argument panels. See id; see also COMMISSION ON STRUCTURAL ALTERNATIVES
FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS OF APPEALS, WORKING PAPERS 95, tbl.7 (1998) (affording relevant data on
disposition times) [hereinafter WORKING PAPERS].
23. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 34-36; Critique, supra note 5, at 823-24; see also
infra note 100 and accompanying text.
24. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 40-45. The Commission specifically rejected circuitsplitting as an acceptable solution for docket growth. Id. at 44; see also infra notes 64-70 and
accompanying text.
25. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 47-50; see also Critique, supra note 5, at 824.
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The most troubling feature of the divisional arrangement is the
Commission's determination to abandon circuit-wide stare decisis. 26 The
divisional concept would jettison the existing circuit-wide en bane court
and encourage inconsistent circuit law by permitting the judges in one
division to ignore the precedent of the other two divisions. 27 Moreover, the
Circuit Division, the Commission's major remedy for this situation, would
be unresponsive principally because of its narrowly circumscribed
authority. 28 For instance, under Senate Bill 253, the Circuit Division could
treat only direct conflicts between divisions and could not entertain cases
sua sponte. 29 The Commission's approach would also eliminate current
informal procedures that enable any judge to notify panel members of possible departures from circuit precedent and to maintain consistency absent
en bane hearings. 30
Implementation of the divisional plan would lead to additional complications. First, applying this idea would impose a new layer of judicial
review. 31 Indeed, the chief judges of seven appellate courts trenchantly admonished that the "whole concept of intracircuit divisions, replete with its
two levels of en bane review, has far more drawbacks than benefits."32
Second, the Supreme Court may be reluctant to hear cases from a single
division that contradict opinions issued by a circuit; even were the Justices
amenable to review, there would be greater pressure on the Supreme Court
to resist the balkanization of federal law.33 Third, the Circuit Division's
thirteen members would rotate slowly and, thus, could "lock out strong
dissenting voices."34 The present eleven-judge limited en bane court, consisting of the chief judge and ten judges drawn at random, is much more
representative of the full court than the proposed Circuit Division's thirteen
members-the chief judge and twelve judges, four from each division for

26. See Hellman, supra note 7, at 382-83; Hug, supra note 6, at 909.
27. See Akrotirianakis et al., supra note 13, at 380-81; Hellman, supra note 7, at 384, 390; Hug,
supra note 6, at 909.
28. See Hellman, supra note 7, at 384-88; see also Tobias, supra note 12, at 306-07.
29. See S. 253, 106th Cong. (1999); COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 45; Hug, supra note 6,
at 909-10.
30. See Hellman, supra note 7, at 390; Hug, supra note 6, at 907. For more discussion of Circuit
Division authority, as well as how ilS decisions' limited impact and the divisions' operation essentially
as separate courlS would make law of the circuit nearly irrelevant, see Hellman, supra note 7, at 38488, 390-91.
31. See Critique, supra note 5, at 825; House Hearing, supra note 17 (statement of Ronald
Olson).
32. Harry T. Edwards et al., Memorandum from Chief Judge to the Commission
on Structural Alternatives for the Federal Courts of Appeals (Nov. 10, 1998)
<http://app.comm.uscour1S.gov/report/comments/Becker.htm> ; accordHug, supra note 6, at 899-906,
909-15.
33. See Critique, supra note 5, at 825. The Supreme Court alone would resolve confliclS between
a division and a circuit. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 45.
34. Critique, supra note 5, at 825-26.
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three-year terms-would be.35 Moreover, the full court would no longer
participate in the en bane process by calling for en bane reconsideration or
voting on whether to take a case en bane under the arrangement that the
Commission recommended. 36 The Commission's approach would also
effectively divide the court "into three circuits" with little justification for
their boundaries or added costs. 37
Notwithstanding these criticisms, the plan might warrant consideration if the Commission had identified a serious failing that smaller
decisionmaking entities could rectify. However, no empirical data demonstrate the existence of any such problems. The Commission's rationale for
the divisional arrangement was that the "law-declaring function of
appellate courts requires groups of judges smaller than the present Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals." 38 The Commission concomitantly premised this
conclusion on two intertwined notions: (1) "the inability of judges [on
large circuits] to monitor all the decisions the entire court of appeals
renders"39 and (2) "large appellate units have difficulty developing and
maintaining consistent and coherent law."40
These propositions cannot withstand scrutiny. The idea that members
of a court must read, remember, and catalog every opinion to keep up with
and apply circuit law is "a relic of the pre-computer era." 41 The
Commission confused quite different actions: staying abreast of circuit
precedent and monitoring of panel decisions.42 The Commission expressed
concern about the "volume of opinions produced by the Ninth Circuit"43
but neglected to state that quantity does not correspond with circuit size, a
phenomenon manifested by three other circuits having issued more

35. See Hug, supra note 6, at 907. Compare sources cited supra note 20 with COMMISSION
REPORT, supra note 2, at 45. Because the Northern Division would have only 22% of the caseload and,
thus, presumably 22% of the judges, and the Southern Division would have 47% of the caseload and
47% of the judges, Circuit Division representation would not proportionately represent the full court.
See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at45; see also Hug, supra note 6, at 909, 915.
36. Compare sources cited supra note 20 and infra note 91 with COMMISSION REPORT, supra note
2, at45.
37.
Critique, supra note 5, at 826-27; see also COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at ix-x, 36;
Hellman, supra note 7, at 392-93 (claiming that the plan would divide the Court of Appeals). The idea
in the text is especially troubling, as the Commission lauds a unified circuit's interpretation of federal
law in the West and preservation of large-scale administrative efficiency. See Critique, supra note 5, at
826-27; infra note 48 and accompanying text.
38. COMMISSION REPORT. supra note 2, at 47.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Procter Hug, Jr., Letter from Chief Judge Procter Hug, Jr., Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals to Justice Byron R. White, United States Supreme Court (Aug. 29, 1998)
<http://app.comm.uscourts.gov/hearings/submitted/hug.htm>.
42. See Hellman, supra note 7, at 394-95.
43. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 47.
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published decisions than the Ninth Circuit in 1998.44 Professor Arthur
Hellman finds "the evidence leaves no doubt that the judges of the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals engage in a substantial amount of opinion
monitoring." 45 His empirical research shows, and the experience of former
Ninth Circuit Judge J. Clifford Wallace confirms,46 the weakness in the
Commission assertion that large appellate entities cannot maintain consistent and coherent law. In short, no convincing empirical data support the
drastic modification that the Commission advocated. 47
Without fairly evaluating how well the Ninth Circuit operates today,
the Commission implied that size alone presents a conundrum that justifies
radical change. The Commission actually conceded that large size affords
benefits. For example, the Commission hailed a unified court's ability to
construe federal law and realize operational efficiencies. 48 Pamela
Rymer-a Ninth Circuit judge and a commissioner who strongly advocates
the Commission plan-similarly testified: "no one seriously questions
how the circuit performs its administrative functions. The circuit's size
allows for flexibility in assignment [and] economies of scale.''49
In short, the Commission's recommendation for a divisional restructuring would neither address the concerns that prompted the study nor realize the Commission's own specifically-~culated objectives.50 Splitting
the Ninth Circuit would also fail to treat the concerns or attain the goals, as
the next section demonstrates.

44. See ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES
COURTS 1998 54, tbl.S-3 (1999).
45. Hellman, supra note 7, at 395; see also id. at 395-96 (adducing evidence from procedure
whereby off-panel judges can use the en bane process to raise questions about opinions); supra note 30
and accompanying text (discussing that procedure).
46. See Hellman, supra note 7, at 397-401; infra notes 79-80 and accompanying text (citing his
work); J. Clifford Wallace, The Case for Large Federal Courts ofAppeals, 77 JUDICATURE 299 (1994).
47. The absence of examples and few specifics are symptomatic of limited evidentiary support,
while the Commission's allusions to ''perceptions" of greater inconsistency in the Ninth Circuit and to
its own "judgment, based on experience" are weak foundations for such radical change. COMMISSION
REPORT, supra note 2, at 47; see also Hellman, supra note 7, at 397-401; Tobias, supra note 12, at 31112.
48. See COM!lllSSION REPORT, supra note 2, at ix-x, 36; Critique, supra note 5, at 827 n.46.
49. Senate Hearing, supra note 17; accord Hellman, supra note 7, at 401-02; Critique, supra
note 5, at 827 n.51.
50. These goals include relieving the Supreme Court without balkanizing federal law, increasing
the legitimacy of the limited en bane process, and retaining a large circuit's major benefits. See
COM!lllSSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 36, 48-50; Critique, supra note 5, at 822-25. For more discussion
of these, and other, criticisms, see Hug, supra note 6, at 909-15; Critique, supra, at 824-27; Hellman,
supra note 7, at 381-401.

CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW

1664

[Vol. 88:1657

II
THE PROPOSALS To SPLIT THE NINTH CIRCUIT

A.

Rationales for Circuit-Splitting

Some of the criticisms of the divisional structure may have led to the
March 2000 proposal of legislation that would split the Ninth Circuit. 51
Senate Bill 2184 was only the latest of numerous attempts to reconfigure
the circuit. Since 1983, there have been five major efforts; the most recent
had commenced in 1995 and culminated in the compromise that authorized
the Commission. 52
Circuit-splitting proponents have presented numerous overlapping
rationales for bifurcation, many of which the Commission reproduced and
we discussed above. 53 Advocates of circuit-splitting also argue that
California perspectives, judges, and appeals dominate the court.54 The
Commission alluded to this contention,55 even as it declared that "[t]here is
one principle that we regard as undebatable: It is wrong to realign circuits
. . . and to restructure courts . . . because of particular decisions or
particular judges."56 Over time, champions of bifurcation have variously
phrased these propositions and accorded them different emphases. Current
proponents downplay the role of California and politics,57 while they emphasize the concerns regarding court administration and other Commission
rationales.

B.

Analysis of Senate Bill 2184

Senate Bill 2184, introduced in March 2000 by Senators Hatch and
Murkowski, 58 would establish a new Twelfth Circuit consisting of Alaska,
Guam, Hawaii, Idaho, Montana, the Northern Mariana Islands, Oregon,
51. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
52. See Thomas E. Baker, On Redrawing Circuit Boundaries-Why the Proposal to Divide tlze
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit is Not Such a Good Idea, 22 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 917,
928-34 (1990); Hellman, supra note 7, at 379-80; Tobias, supra note 6, at 198-214.
53. These reasons include size, inadequate collegiality and interpersonal communication, slow
case resolution and insufficiently consistent and coherent circuit law that allegedly results from the
inability of judges to "keep up with the large volume" of opinions and of the court to perform its e11
bane functions effectively. CoM!lfiSSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 34-37; see also supra notes 19-20
and accompanying text.
54. See Baker, supra note 52, at 940-43; Carl Tobias, The Impoverished Idea of Circ11it·Splitting,
44 EMORY L.J. 1357, 1371-73 (1995). A recent incarnation of this argument appears in a Senate debate
over confirmation. "[T]he 9th Circuit has become lopsided with activist judges that has helped push it
far out of the judicial mainstream .... Confirming Richard Paez and Marsha Berzon to the 9th Circuit
would only exacerbate its problems." 146 CoNG. REc. S1298 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 2000) (statement of
Sen. Bunning).
55. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 36.
56. Id. at 6. ''This rule must be faithfully honored, for the independence of the judiciary is of
constitutional dimension and requires no less." Id.
57. See supra notes 53-54 and accompanying text.
58. See 146 CONG. REc. S1233 (daily ed. Mar. 7, 2000).
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and Washington, leaving Arizona, California, and Nevada in the Ninth
Circuit.59 The sponsors supported the proposal with previously-enunciated
reasons, such as intra-circuit inconsistency, a high reversal rate, inability of
the courts' members to monitor all opinions, and deficiencies in the limited
en bane process. 60 Senator Hatch explained the last two ideas:
Absent the ability of each active judge on the Ninth Circuit to read
each ... published decision, there can be no assurance that calls
will be made for en bane review of those cases which judges
believe merit rehearing, ... [while the en bane] system is being
utilized with insufficient frequency ... [and] a limited en bane
decision ... [may] not reflect the views of a majority of the
circuit's judges.61
Senator Murkowski specifically stated that Senate Bill 2184 was a "more
direct and simplified solution to the problems of the Ninth Circuit" than the
divisional arrangement with which a few Senate members "were not too
happy."62
Among the many reasons that Congress should not enact Senate Bill
2184, there are some ideas that resemble the criticisms of the divisional
approach as well as others that include the Commission's cogent arguments against bifurcation.63 The Commission saw "no good reason to split
the circuit solely out of concern for its size or administration ... [or] the
consistency, predictability, and coherence of circuit law," while "splitting
the circuit would impose substantial costs of administrative disruption
[and] the monetary costs of creating a new circuit.''64 The Commission
considered bifurcation an improper long-term solution to the caseload increases that most appellate courts will encounter.65 For example, circuitsplitting could further burden the Supreme Court and additionally splinter
federal law, mainly by increasing intercircuit inconsistency. 66 The
Commission also observed that this remedy would "deprive the West and
59. See S. 2184, 106th Cong. (2000).
60. Each ascribed these to size. See 146 CONG. REc. at Sl233-34 (statement of Sen. Murkowski);
id. at S 1234-35 (statement of Sen. Hatch); see also supra notes 19-20, 53 and accompanying text.
61. 146 CONG. REc. at S 1235. He stated that two circuits, whose judges ''will have one-half as
many of their colleagues' opinions to read," would better promote error correction and coherence. Id.
62. Id. at S1233.
63. In light of our analysis above, certain arguments deserve relatively limited treatment here.
However, additional consideration is warranted because the Commission is an authoritative source that
carefully analyzed the issues. Moreover, it was unable to respond directly to the sponsors' contentions.
64. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at ix, 29. The Commission expressly stated that
bifurcation would sacrifice administrative advantages, including flexible judicial assignments and
specific economies of scale. See supra notes 48-49 and accompanying text.
65. See CoMr.nssION REPORT, supra note 2, at x, 44; see also WORKING PAPERS, supra note 22, at
93, tbl. l (affording caseload data).
66. See, e.g., Thomas E. Baker & Douglas D. McFarland, The Need for a New National Court,
100 HARV. L. REv. 1400, 1404-09 (1987); Tobias, supra note 54, at 1386-87; Critique, supra note 5, at
824.
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the Pacific seaboard of a means for maintaining uniform federal law in that
area." 67 Praising the administrative advantages of retaining a unified circuit, the Commission confidently concluded that the divisional concept
would vitiate the need for a split.68 The Commission explored more than a
dozen possibilities for bifurcation and "found no merit in any:" 69
[l]t is impossible to create from the current Ninth Circuit two or
more circuits that would result in both an equitable number of
appeals per judge and courts of appeals small enough to operate
with the sort of collegiality we envision, unless the State of
California were to be split between judicial circuits-an option we
believe to be undesirable. 70
The Commission and other observers correctly concluded that the
complex geographic and demographic configuration of the Ninth Circuit
makes it defy bifurcation.71 The recent bill, like numerous earlier measures,
would require judges of the proposed Ninth Circuit to address a considerably larger, more complicated docket than judges of the projected Twelfth
Circuit.72 A split would correspondingly eliminate the appellate court that
has long employed, and experimented with, creative measures to address
mounting appeals. 73 The circuit should continue this ambitious testing because caseload growth and comparatively limited resources suggest that
most courts will increasingly resemble the Ninth Circuit, which will serve
as a model. 74

67. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at x. It similarly declared that having one court in the
West interpret federal law, especially "commercial and maritime laws that govern relations with [other
Pacific Rim nations is a strength] that should be maintained." Id. at 49-50.
68. See id. at 52; see also supra notes 48-49 and accompanying text.
69. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at53; see also infra notes 71-74 and accompanying text.
70. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 52.
71. See supra notes 69-70 and accompanying text; see also Baker, supra note 52, at 938, 945-46;
Tobias, supra note 54, at 1409-15.
72. See, e.g., S. 431, 105th Cong. (1997); S. 956, 104th Cong. (1995); Carl Tobias, Why
Congress Should Not Split the Ninth Circuit, 50 SMU L. REv. 583, 590-91 (1997). These ideas
contradict Senator Hatch's claim that each new court's judges would read only half as many cases. See
supra note 61.
73. See JOE CECIL, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE IN A LARGE APPELLATE
COURT: THE NINTH CIRCUIT INNOVATIONS PROJECT (1985); RESTRUCTURING JUSTICE: THE
INNOVATIONS OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT AND THE FUTURE OF THE FEDERAL COURTS (Arthur D. Hellman
ed., 1990). The Commission seemed to recognize this by finding Ninth Circuit administration "on a par
with that of other circuits, and innovative in many respects," creativity that screening panels' use
illustrates. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at ix; see also infra notes 106-107 and accompanying
text (analyzing screening panels).
74. See, e.g., Hellman, supra note 7, at 402; Wallace, supra note 46. Responses to the sponsors'
ideas elsewhere obviate the need for more treatment here. For example, insofar as they repeat the
Commission ideas about large courts and the reversal rate, we have addressed the ideas. Compare
supra notes 19-20, 38-40, 60 and accompanying text with supra notes 41-47, infra notes 96-98 and
accompanying text. For a thorough critique of circuit-splitting, see THOMAS E. BAKER, RATIONING
JUSTICE ON APPEAL: THE PROBLEMS OF THE U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS 99-105 (1994).
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In sum, the major difficulty with both the divisional concept and
circuit-splitting is misplaced reliance on unsupported assumptions that the
Ninth Circuit experiences severe problems and, therefore, should be restructured into divisions or into two separate courts to resolve the
complications. 75 No empirical data demonstrate that the Ninth Circuit has
serious failings or requires such dramatic alteration. 76 Finally, drastic
change should be rejected when more promising measures are readily
available.

m
THE NINTH CIRCUIT APPROACH

In contrast to the proposed draconian solutions of restructuring into
autonomous divisions or circuit-splitting, the Ninth Circuit has adopted a
tempered approach for addressing the perceived shortcomings reported to
or considered by the Commission. In 1999, shortly after the Commission
issued its final report, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals established an
Evaluation Committee. The Committee has assessed and continues to analyze circuit processes and procedures and has already suggested a score of
ways to enhance operations in areas highlighted by the Commission.77

A.

Consistent and Certain Circuit Law

Both the Commission and the sponsors of Senate Bill 2184 erroneously assert that Ninth Circuit law lacks uniformity and coherence. 78 The
"only systematic study" of the operation of precedent in a large court,
which assessed efforts "to maintain a consistent body of law ,"79 found that
"the pattern of [multiple relevant precedents] exemplified by high visibility
issues . . . is not characteristic of Ninth Circuit jurisprudence generally.
Nor is intracircuit conflict."80 The Commission acknowledged, yet

75. Neither the great majority of judges and lawyers in the Ninth Circuit nor those appearing at
the hearings in the Ninth Circuit or submitting statements think so. See Hug, supra note 6, at 897.
76. Change so drastic as the Commission and the sponsors urge in a century-old institution
should occur only if empirical data clearly show that the court experiences serious difficulties. See
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., LoNG RANGE PLAN FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS 44-45 (1995).
77. See NINTH CIRCUIT EVALUATION COMMITTEE, INTERIM REPORT (2000) [hereinafter
EVALUATION COMMITTEE, INTERIM REPORT]. In July 1999, the Committee solicited the bar's input on
the en bane process, consistency and certainty, regional concerns and calendaring, delay and
productivity, written and oral advocacy, mediation and technology. See id. at 1-2.
78. See supra notes 19, 60-61 and accompanying text.
79. JUDITH MCKENNA, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., STRUCTURAL AND OTHER ALTERNATIVES FOR THE
FEDERAL COURTS OF APPEALS 94 (1993). The Federal Judicial Center is the courts' research arm. See
28 U.S.C. § 620 et seq. (1994).
80. Arthur D. Hellman, Maintaining Consistency in the Law of the Large Circuit, in
RESTRUCTURING JUSTICE, supra note 73, at 86. The study covered two distinct years of Ninth Circuit
opinions, which the court decided over a much longer period. See MCKENNA, supra note 79, at 94;
Hellman, supra note 7, at 398.
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essentially ignored, that study81 and did not even mention a subsequent
Federal Judicial Center evaluation that mirrors the initial study's findings. 82
Admitting that the Commission lacked time to conduct a "statistically
meaningful analysis" of all Ninth Circuit dispositions to make an objective
determination,83 the Commission undertook a survey of the court's district
judges and lawyers that provided only inconclusive results 84 and ultimately
conceded that "consistency and predictability [defy] statistical analysis."85
In short, neither the Commission nor the circuit-splitting advocates
presented empirical data to document that the court's law is less uniform
than that of the remaining circuits. All of the empirical data actually suggest otherwise. Nevertheless, because the Evaluation Committee thought
that circuit size could lead to a perception of inconsistency, it focused on
strengthening the capacity of the court for early detection and immediate
treatment of possible or apparent conflicts.86 The Committee asked that
judges and counsel notify the court of inconsistencies among unpublished
memorandum dispositions and between those decisions and published
opinions, creating an "electronic mailbox" to facilitate this exchange. 87
Moreover, it urged, and the Advisory Rules Committee has implemented, a
two-year experiment whereby lawyers may cite unpublished memorandum
dispositions in petitions for rehearing or requests for publication in order to
identify perceived conflicts.88 The circuit is also currently testing the
Committee's proposed system in which staff attorneys employ their
81. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 39 n.93. "It is the Commission's prerogative to
reject the methods or conclusions of empirical research, but it is regrettable that the Commission
simply gives up and declares that the concepts are too subtle to warrant analysis." Hellman, supra note
7, at 398.
82. "[D]espite concerns about the proliferation of precedent as the courts of appeals grow, there
is currently little evidence that intracircuit inconsistency is a significant problem ... [or] that whatever
intracircuit conflict exists is strongly correlated with circuit size." MCKENNA, supra note 79, at 94;
accord Hellman, supra note 7, at 398.
83. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 39.
84. For example, district judges "find(] the law insufficiently clear to give them confidence in
their decisions on questions of law about as often as their counterparts in other circuits,'' while
attorneys report "somewhat more difficulty discerning circuit law and predicting outcomes of appeals
than lawyers elsewhere." Id. at 39-40; see also Hellman, supra note 7, at 399 (urging "caution in
interpreting the survey results").
85. CoMr.nsslON REPORT, supra note 2, at 40. "These concepts are too subtle, the decline in
quality too incremental, and the effects of size too difficult to isolate, to allow evaluation in a frcezeframed moment." Id. But see supra note 81.
86. See EvALUATION COMMITTEE, INTERIM REPORT, supra note 77, at 8-10.
87. See Chief Judge Procter Hug, Jr., Responding to Ninth Circuit Concerns: The Innovative
Work of the Evaluation Committee 2 (2000) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author);
Memorandum from Office of the Clerk, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, to Members of the
Academic Community (Jan. 2000) (on file with author) (providing the conflicts form).
88. See EVALUATION COMMITTEE, INTERIM REPORT, supra note 77, at 6-7. Lawyers can also
alert the circuit to conflicts. See Hug, supra note 87, at 2; see also 9TH CIR. R. 36-3 (Circuit Rule 36-3
has been adopted for a limited 30-month period, beginning July 1, 2000 and ending December 31,
2002. Thereafter the Advisory Committee on Rules will issue a recommendation on whether the rule
should be made permanent).
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subject-matter expertise and objective criteria to monitor rehearing en bane
petitions to identify potential inconsistencies and sensitive decisions for
careful judicial scrutiny.89

B.

The Limited En Banc Process

The senators who introduced Senate Bill 2184 seemingly accepted
without question the Commission's claims that the en bane process is not
representative and prompts the Supreme Court to reverse many cases.90
Both notions are unpersuasive. The circuit believes the limited en bane
process uses scarce institutional resources effectively and respects all
judges' interest in law-declaration.91 However, to address the perception of
unrepresentativeness, the Evaluation Committee commissioned an expert,
independent study that reaffirmed the legitimacy of the process by finding
that eleven members do "fairly represent the court as a whole." 92 Despite
this conclusion, the Committee asked the circuit to examine enlarging the
en bane court and reducing the number of votes needed to take a case en
bane, potentially expanding the quantity of annual appeals heard en bane. 93
The court endorsed these concepts as a "reasoned, responsible alternative
to the radical restructuring proposed by Senate Bill 253" because it is "as
concerned with perceptions as with reality ."94 In recognition that the
changes will increase en bane reconsideration, the circuit has also begun to
experiment with quarterly sessions of the en bane court.95
The proposition that the limited en bane device contributes to a high
reversal rate in the Supreme Court is even less convincing. The reversal
rate has minimal relevance to court administration and structure. Circuit
Judge Rymer, a Commission member, "representing and speaking on its
behalf," testified that the reversal rate "is not a problem that the
Commission identified or ... believes should weigh into the consideration

89. The criteria include invalidation of a statute or issuance of a dissent. See Hug, supra note 87,
at 2. The Committee is evaluating internal review of all cases for consistency before their release. See

id.
90. Compare supra notes 60-61 and accompanying text with supra note 20 and accompanying
text.
91. See Hug, supra note 87, at 3. Each active and senior judge can request en bane rehearing,
while the entire process promotes productive exchange regarding legal issues. See id.
92. Id. at 3-4. An en bane court of eleven judges is approximately 94% representative
statistically. Since Congress authorized the limited en bane court in 1978, the court bas issued over 170
decisions. A third of the opinions were unanimous, and 75% had a majority of eight to three or greater,
which strongly suggests that a full-court en bane would have reached identical decisions. Id. at 3.
93. See EVALUATION COM!lllTTEE, INTERIM REPORT, supra note 77, at 2-6. Senate Bill 1403,
106th Cong. (1999), which Senator Dianne Feinstein introduced, embodies these ideas and regional
assignments, discussed infra notes 94, 102 and accompanying text; see also supra note 17.
94. Hug, supra note 87, at 4. The circuit also endorsed regional assignments. See id. at 2; see also
infra note 102 and accompanying text.
95. See EVALUATION COM!IHTTEE, INTERIM REPORT, supra note 77, at 5-6.
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of structural alternatives."96 Moreover, the ten-year reversal rate statistics
reveal that the number of Ninth Circuit decisions overturned has never exceeded one half of one percent of the total circuit terminations on the merits.97 The Ninth Circuit's reversal rate was also lower than the median
reversal rate for three years and within eight percentage points of the
median for two, and it was highest of all the circuits in only one year out of
the ten.98

C.

Collegiality and Communications

The sponsors of Senate Bill 2184 appeared to adopt uncritically the
Commission's claims that the circuit lacks collegiality and interpersonal
communication.99 However, these notions defy empirical verification, as
the Commission frankly admitted in stating that collegiality "cannot be
quantified or measured," even as it recognized that continuing reliance on
technology will improve communication and case resolution. 100 The
Evaluation Committee found no problems with collegiality in the Ninth
Circuit; however, the Committee has proffered several ideas on regionalism and calendaring to address perceived concerns about communications,
collegiality, circuit linkages with the areas served, and the need for regional viewpoints in appellate decisionmaking. 101 It proposed, and the circuit is testing, regional assignments that require one judge from the
administrative unit out of which the appeal arises to serve on the panel
hearing the case. 102 Moreover, the Committee recommended, and the court
has employed, oral argument sittings in more cities and combined them
with bench-bar activities to improve communications throughout the
circuit. 103

96.

Senate Hearing, supra note 17. For similar ideas, see COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at

6.

97. See NINTH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS LAW LIBRARY TABLE ON U.S. SUPREME COURT
REVERSAL RATES (1998).
98. See id.; see also Jerome Farris, The Ninth Circuit-Most Maligned Circuit in the CoulltryFact or Fiction?, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 1465 (1997); Marybeth Herald, Reversed, Vacated, and Split: The
Supreme Court, the Ninth Circuit, and the Congress, 77 OR. L. REV. 405 (1998). Another concern is
circuit inability to keep up with the volume of cases.See supra notes 19, 39, 43 and accompanying text.
But see supra notes 41-42, 44-47 and accompanying text.
99. Compare Hatch and Murkowski Statements, supra note 60 with supra note 19 and
accompanying text.
100. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 40; see also Critique, supra note 5, at 824. For
analyses of collegiality, see FRANK COFFIN, ON APPEAL: COURTS, LAWYERING, AND JUDGING 215
(1994); Harry T. Edwards, Collegiality and Decision Making on the D.C. Circuit, 84 VA. L. REv. 1335,
1358-62 (1998); Deanell Reece Taeha, The "C" Word: On Collegiality, 56 OHIO ST. L.J. 585 (1995).
101. See EVALUATION COMMITTEE, INTERIM REPoRT, s11pra note 77, at 12-13.
102. See id.
103. See id. at 13. In 1999 alone, the court held oral arguments and bench-bar meetings in
Anchorage, Coeur d' Alene (Idal!o), Missoula (Mont.), San Diego, Phoenix, and Honolulu. See id.
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Productivity and Expediting Review

In response to perceived concerns about case delays, the Evaluation
Committee has instituted several actions to enhance productivity and expedite review. 104 It has suggested, and the court is experimenting with, increased "batching" of cases that involve similar issues or statutes before
the same argument panel for faster disposition. 105 The Committee has urged
continuing use of the innovative oral motions and screening calendars106 in
which a panel considers relatively uncomplicated appeals-ones that clear
precedent readily resolves-in deciding 340 motions and 140 cases each
month. 107
For the reasons stated, we believe that the faulty assumptions and
premises, as well as the lack of empirical data, that underlie the
Commission's work and the recent sponsorship of Senate Bill 2184 raise
serious questions about the wisdom of implementing the changes that the
Commission and circuit-splitting advocates champion. Nevertheless, the
Evaluation Committee has begun to treat perceived concerns, and the court
has already implemented many of the Committee's recommendations.
Fortunately, the circuit can apply most of the proposals without
congressional authorization. These measured, well-considered steps to address perceived concerns, if coupled with prompt Senate confirmation of
nominees for the current circuit vacancies, 108 should enable the court to
function at the peak of its abilities and eliminate any concerns about circuit
operations. The Committee's approach will relieve the Supreme Court, yet
not splinter federal law, by limiting intracircuit and intercircuit inconsistency; will enhance the validity of the en bane process, primarily through
increased frequency of application; and will retain a large circuit's benefits
because it would leave the circuit intact. In sum, the Evaluation Committee
approach should attain the goals of the Commission and the sponsors of
Senate Bill 2184 with greater efficacy and less disruption than their proposals.
CONCLUSION

The Commission on Structural Alternatives for the Federal Courts of
Appeals and the introduction of Senate Bill 2184 have advanced the
104. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
105. See EVALUATION CoM?.fiTTEE, INTERIM REPORT, supra note 77, at 71.
106. See Hug, supra note 87.
107. See id.; Co1111111ss10N REPORT, supra note 2, at 31. The above measures and other actions
show that the circuit is treating concerns apart from ones voiced by the Commission and the sponsors,
and is responsive to all of its consumers. The process is ongoing, and. the court is committed to
continuing self-analysis and to more testing and innovation which will foster even greater future
efficacy. See Hug, supra note 87.
108. See supra note 22 and accompanying text. See generally Carl Tobias, Filling the Federal
Appellate Openings on the Ninth Circuit, 19 REv. LITIG. 233 (2000); sources cited supra note 54.
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dialogue about the Ninth Circuit. However, the court's continued application of, and experimentation with, a broad spectrum of promising measures
will better address the concerns identified than either the divisional concept
or circuit-splitting. Congress is now considering the two more drastic
approaches, but it should reject them as ineffective and unduly disruptive.

